The series of case studies that follows emanates from a request by the Sub-committee on Nutrition of the United Nations Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC/ SCN) to carry out an examination of what works in nutrition programmes in low-income countries. The idea was to look at successful nutrition initiatives, and at those that might have been successful under somewhat different sets of conditions. Such information, it was hoped, might assist potentially interested governments and assistance agencies in assessing whether expenditures on nutrition today have the potential of helping to meet this most important of basic human needs.
For this purpose a group of case studies are presented here covering successful, or nearly successful, activities, with a concluding section seeking to generalize from this experience. The concept of nutrition in this context is broadly defined to cover activities with a potentially direct effect on food intake and/or nutritional status. This encompasses a spectrum of activities from consumer food subsidies to community health programmes.
Selection of cases to study was-perhaps inevitably-a somewhat arbitrary process. There were, however, several basic guidelines used. The first was to include at least one activity in each of the following programme categories: food subsidies, food security, the incorporation of nutrition considerations in broader development pursuits, community health and nutrition, nutrition education, and food fortification.
A second criterion was one of size. Large is by no means necessarily beautiful in the area of nutrition; but, as there have been of late a number of outstanding publications concentrating on smaller, community-level activities (see, for example, refs. 1-3, and numerous issues of Les Carnets d'Enfance/Assignment Children), this paper seeks to complement those important documents by examining projects that cover larger physical areas and that raise somewhat different but equally important questions.
The second criterion led naturally to a third, a desire not to duplicate coverage of projects discussed in those publications. Accordingly, I have left out a number of activities that might otherwise well have been included, among them the Narangwal, Candelaria, and Companiganj projects, each with its important and particular sets of lessons.
I. THE SRI LANKA FOOD SUBSIDY PROGRAMME

Background
In recent years there has been much discussion of food subsidies (subsidized food consumption) in low-income countries. In fact, there are few development issues that have elicited as much controversy.
Food subsidy systems using food rationing, food stamps, or government-controlled and subsidized open market prices currently operate in every country of South Asia plus Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Egypt, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Tanzania, Zambia, and Colombia.
Critics of subsidized consumption systems argue that they are enormously expensive and utilize funds that otherwise could be invested. In Egypt in 1975 these subsidies represented 21 per cent of the annual government expenditure, and in Sri Lanka the figure has been as high as 25 per cent. Critics also argue that such programmes have high administrative opportunity costs and may adversely affect domestic agricultural production. The most active opponent of food subsidies has been the International Monetary Fund, which has applied considerable pressure on many governments to reduce or eliminate such subsidies. The IMF (with several other development banks and international assistance agencies) has taken the position that food subsidies are expensive "political" gestures that must be replaced by sound "economic" policies.
Supporters of subsidized food consumption urge that they are by no means wasteful political gestures but rather represent potentially powerful instruments to improve the distribution of income, to increase food consumption, and to reduce malnutrition among low-F. James Levinson Consultant, UN ACC Sub-committee on Nutrition The advocates argue that these food subsidies represent the cornerstone of overall basic needs programmes and that, if the meeting of basic human needs constitutes a primary goal of development, these subsidies constitute a crucial element of development strategy and should be maintained until the need for them has been eliminated. Finally, advocates suggest that food subsidies, as part of a basic needs package, may contribute to a reduction in the rate of population growth. This section and the next seek to examine these food subsidy systems in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Both are poor relative to other Third World countries. Average per capita GNP is roughly US$150 in Sri Lanka and US$110 in Bangladesh.
The Programme
As in many countries, food rationing in Sri Lanka was initiated during the Second World War, when the supply of food imports was interrupted. Subsidized rationing then was continued as a means of protecting lowerincome groups against inflation. The subsidy went through various phases with different political regimes. During most of the early 1970s, however, each citizen over one year of age was entitled to a free ration of two pounds of rice per week, with an equal amount provided at a subsidized rate. The food subsidy also included wheat flour, sugar, and a range of less important items.
As seen in table 1, the subsidy provided a major increment to the caloric value of the diet, with major benefits going to low-income groups. For those earning less than 400 rupees (SRs 400 = approximately US$27) per month (80 per cent of the population), this subsidy constituted 20 per cent of their total caloric intake and 14 to 15 per cent of their incomes (6, p. 33 ). The food subsidy, coupled with similar subsidies in education, health, and transportation, and a progressive tax structure, resulted in major redistribution of income. Between 1965 and 1973 the lowest docile of the population increased its percentage of the nation's total disposable income from 3.5 to 6.1 per cent, while the highest decile suffered a reduction from 31 to 22 per cent. (Paul Isenman, in a particularly provocative paper on Sri Lanka, makes the point that the severe political constraints to substantial redistribution of income or assets in most countries appear to operate less stringently when food, rather than money or land, is to be distributed [7] .)
Although nutritional deficiencies continued to exist in Sri Lanka, the public food distribution system over those years appears to have had the effect of avoiding the highly skewed distribution of food intake that characterizes many low-income countries. Data from the 1969/70 socio-economic survey indicate that only 25 per cent of the population consumed less than the 2,200-calorie-perday standard set for that country, and that only 5 per cent consumed less than 1,900 calories (7) . By comparison, in Bangladesh, a country with a similar per capita GNP and much higher levels of foreign assistance even on a per capita basis, fully 35 per cent of the population were found to consume less than 1,800 calories per day (8) . Sri Lanka's comparatively balanced food distribution, in combination with a broad-based health care system. and a major anti-malaria campaign, resulted in a reduction in the infant mortality rate from an estimated 142 in 1946 (about the same as in Bangladesh today) to 46 In 1978 an attempt was made to target the programme better and reduce costs by restricting ration system eligibility to households earning less than SRs 300 (US$20) per month (slightly higher for larger families). This reduced eligible beneficiaries by roughly 50 per cent. Then a year later the ration system was eliminated, along with most of the price subsidies, and replaced by a food-stamp programme with the same eligibility. This action was part of a larger package urged by the IMF, which included reduction or elimination of all subsidies, government decontrol in many sectors, and the encouragement of foreign private investment. This programme further reduced costs and in 1980 represented only 7 per cent of total government expenditures (as opposed to the high of 25 per cent under the ration system). At the outset, the benefits of the food-stamp programme per beneficiary were roughly equivalent to those under the previous ration system. However, after two years of the programme, rapid inflation had reduced the purchasing power of the stamps to roughly half of their original worth, as indicated in table 2. In addition, the Government at this time eliminated the subsidies that had been placed over the years on imported rice, sugar, and wheat flour. As a result, and in spite of a vigorous employment-generating strategy, recent surveys carried out by the Food and Nutrition Policy Planning Division of the Ministry of Health indicate that the nutritional and health status of lower socio-economic groups has deteriorated in several districts of the country (10) . Other recent data indicate that the country's impressive redistribution of income in the 1960s and early 1970s has been reversed, and those gains largely eliminated.
Primary criticism of the food-stamp programme within the Government, however, relates to its high cost, even at these reduced levels, and to abuses in programme operations. (As many as 30 per cent of present recipients may be above the economic cut-off point, while an estimated 10 per cent of eligible families have not been included.) As a result, the Government is currently considering replacement of the food-stamp programme with some form of welfare payment to needy families.
Lessons from the Sri Lanka Experience
Any assessment of the effect of the public food distribution programmes in Sri Lanka on nutritional well-being, at least from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, must recognize these programmes in the context of a broader development strategy that sought, with considerable commitment, to meet the basic needs of its low-income population. The strategy included land reform, progressive income taxes and labour and wage laws, subsidies on primary education, broad-based health care, and cheap transport.
In the context of such a strategy and level of commitment, the Sri Lanka food subsidies appeared to have considerable value in avoiding the high degree of malnutrition and malnutrition-related deaths from which most countries with average per capita incomes of less than US$200 suffer (7) . In the absence of such broadbased commitment, food subsidies can have negligible or even negative effects on the well-being of the poor, as indicated in the following section on Bangladesh.
The major stumbling block from the first years of the programme through the present has been budgetary. This poses the question of whether the same substantial benefits -the avoidance of serious malnutrition and the sharp reduction in infant mortality-could have accrued at lower cost.
At the outside, reference should at least be made to the possibility posed by James Grant, Executive Director of UNICEF, and others that, if these reductions in malnutrition and mortality and the associated substantial fall in the birth rate were in part the result of a large-scale food subsidy programme, the cost-even 25 per cent of a national budget-is not necessarily too high.
But, even putting aside this possibility, there almost certainly were means by which a different set of decisions (at least in the early years before expectations were conditioned and political battle lines set) might have produced these results at a much reduced cost. 1. The early decision to provide some portion of food free meant that, by definition, programme costs would continually increase with inflation. If a political pledge were necessary, the more practical one might have been to a ration price at a fixed percentage below the open market. 2. For most of the life of the programme, high costs also resulted from its universal coverage, a luxury that no country can easily afford. The two means of reducing beneficiary size are: a. imposition of an administratively imposed means test, as eventually was done in Sri Lanka; b. utilization of lower-status food commodities, inherently less desirable to upper and middle-income groups, as opposed to rice, the world's highest-status food grain (see the following section on the use of this principle in Bangladesh). 3. The range of commodities offered at subsidized prices in Sri Lanka probably was unnecessarily large, given that food purchase savings just as easily could have been concentrated in one or two commodities. The Government further added to operational and administrative costs by offering larger numbers of food stamps to young children than to adults, theoretically to permit the purchase of more expensive condensed milk. In fact, as indicated by the results of the recent programme evaluation (10), milk purchase was found to be unrelated to the number or age of children in the family. More often, milk was purchased with food stamps, given the ease of re-selling it on the market. Sale proceeds then generally were used to purchase rice, which, strangely, was often less expensive on the open market than in the government-controlled co-operatives where food stamps were redeemed. 4. If programme costs still were found to be unacceptably high, operation of the programme could have been restricted to those months of the year when food needs are greater (the traditional hungry seasons). This would add a seasonal targeting dimension to income-group targeting.
II. THE BANGLADESH SORGHUM PROGRAMME
Background
As suggested in section I, one potentially valuable means of targeting beneficiaries and reducing costs in a food subsidy programme is through the utilization of lowerstatus food commodities. This was found to be the case in Pakistan, where the use of flour-milled whole wheat (nutritionally valuable but of low status) in that country's ration system had the effect of targeting offtakes toward the lowest-income groups, without a politically and administratively problematic means test.
The need for such targeting is particularly acute in Bangladesh, where the ration system has traditionally been oriented towards the politically pivotal urban middle class, rather than towards the basic needs of the poor. The Bangladesh ration system, which provides rice and wheat at roughly two-thirds of open-market prices, reaches less than 25 per cent of the country's population and less than 15 per cent of the rural population. Fully 70 per cent of food distributed through the ration system goes to urban consumers, yet only 27 per cent of the poorest and most malnourished urban families have access to the system.
The Sorghum Experiment
In 1978 a group of concerned individuals from the Bangladesh Government's Ministry of Food, the Institute of Nutrition and Food Science at the University of Dacca, and the United States Agency for International Development began meeting to consider whether it might be possible to bias the offtake to the country's ration system toward lower-income groups through changes in the commodities offered.
The foods found to exhibit desirable characteristics in Bangladesh-i.e., low price, a low or negative income elasticity of demand among middle-and upper-income groups but a relatively high elasticity of demand among the poor, and relatively high nutritional value-were the coarse grains (the millets and sorghum). These crops were also desirable because they are produced easily and inexpensively on land not suited for rice and wheat production. Irrigation is not necessary, as the coarse grains are drought-resistant. At present, almost half a million acres are under coarse-grain production in Bangladesh.
To examine the viability of this concept, a study was initiated in the urban ration system in Dacca and in the rural ration systems in Faridpur and Jessore districts in the southwestern part of the country. The coarse grain selected for the test, sorghum, was introduced into 20 ration shops scattered throughout Dacca city, and 103 rural ration shops in Faridpur and Jessore, principally from August to October 1978. A price of 1.25 take (Tk 1.25 = approximately US$0.08) per kilogram, about half the price of rice and five-eighths the price of wheat, was set by the Government. Sorghum was offered to consumers either in addition to their regular rice and/or wheat rations, or as an equal volume substitute for all or part of the regular ration.
As expected, given the predominance of middle-class consumers in the urban ration system, sorghum sales in Dacca were extremely low, rarely exceeding 5 per cent of the consumers in any given shop. However, in the rural ration system the results were quite different.
Rural consumers can be categorized by the type of ration card allocated to them. These categories, from the lowest, A, to the highest, D, are based on the land tax paid: A-card holders, generally landless, pay no land tax; other card holders pay Tk 3 to Tk 15 (US$0.20 to US$1.00) per acre per year. (These rates are themselves a commentary on the Government's inability, or unwillingness, to generate revenue from land-holders.) The group unrepresented in this breakdown is the so-called floating population, the migrants with no specific address and, therefore, in Bangladesh, ineligible to use the ration system at all. This floating population, inevitably the poorest of all, is estimated at 10 per cent of rural households. Table 3 presents the results for Jessore District, from which the most complete data were collected. The table indicates not only the substantial percentage of ration shop users who purchased sorghum during these three months, but also the strong bias toward the lowest-income consumers, the A-and B card holders. Finally, it indicates that, with greater exposure, the use of sorghum by these low-income groups increases to a level of almost 70 per cent among the A-card holders, while sorghum consumption among the D-card holders falls to 1.5 per cent of those using the system. The table indicates clearly that the introduction of sorghum in the rural ration system had the potential to bias offtakes sharply toward the poor and increase the benefits this group could derive from the system. It seemed to be a natural means of addressing the astonishingly high rates of malnutrition in the country and, indirectly, the highly skewed distribution of income.
Demise of the Programme
In terms of nutritional criteria, the project certainly could be labelled successful. It reached the lowestincome families, among whom the most serious malnutrition is concentrated in Bangladesh. It provided these families with the opportunity to double their caloric intake at the same cost, or to maintain constant caloric levels at half the cost. The food used was nutritionally equivalent to the existing commodities and was consumed by children as well as adults. Even in the absence of an explicit assessment, it is almost certain that changes in nutritional intake would result from the increased food available and/or the increased savings, because low-income groups in Bangladesh spend up to 85 per cent of income increments on food. These increases in food intake among families consuming less than 80 per cent of their caloric needs and among children suffering from second-or thirddegree malnutrition would, in turn, generally result in marked improvement in nutritional status.
In spite of this (and, ironically, in part because of it), the programme was short-lived. Because in 1978 sorghum production in Bangladesh was still relatively small and beyond the scope of government procurement programmes the decision was made to provide sorghum from the United States for the initial project, with the idea that increased domestic consumption and increased consciousness of sorghum as a food for people would, in turn, boost local production. This had, in fact, been the case with wheat, a commodity not traditionally produced in Bangladesh.
While the United States Department of Agriculture agreed reluctantly to provide initial shipments of sorghum, the traditionally powerful wheat lobby working within it quickly perceived the sorghum initiative as a threat to its growing wheat exports to Bangladesh. {Sorghum, never a major commodity under US Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, has no such interest group to support its export abroad.} The Bangladesh Government, meanwhile, expressed no reluctance to receive the sorghum on a purely grant basis. It did, however, make clear from the outset that sorghum was lowest on its list of priorities, and that it would prefer, at any point, to substitute additional quantities of wheat, or better yet, cotton or edible oil-all commodities disproportionately consumed by the urban middle class.
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Toward success in combating malnutrition Soon, however, even this passive acceptance began to erode. Ration shop dealers, used to a substantial profit on government supplies, found that sorghum-the poor person's food-had no black-market value. Accordingly, over time, despite government directives, an increasingly large number of ration shop dealers simply neglected to pick up their sorghum allotments, thus creating movement and storage problems for the Government.
Despite empirical evidence that programme benefits were going almost exclusively to those in greatest need and were helping to meet the critical nutritional needs of these unfortunate families, the opposition of the USDA and the apathy of the Bangladesh Government proved decisive. Sorghum imports and distribution were quietly terminated in early 1980 without either a complaint or a word or explanation.
III. INCORPORATING NUTRITION INTO THE PALAWAN INTEGRATED AREA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN THE PHILIPPINES
Background
Traditionally, combating malnutrition has implied programmes designed explicitly to improve nutritional wellbeing: child-feeding, nutrition education, and food enrichment or fortification. Indeed, these types of programmes have occupied the major attention of the international nutrition community for the past few decades. There is, however, general recognition today that the effect on nutritional status and food consumption levels of these direct nutrition interventions is far less significant than that of broader development programmes, particularly those related to food, agriculture, and rural development.
The problems facing the nutrition community in this regard are basically twofold: (a) We not only lack knowledge of the specific nutrition/consumption effects of these programmes but often do not even know whether these effects are positive or negative. (b) We generally have been incapable of affecting broader development policy and programmes on nutritional grounds.
In both cases the problem emanates from the traditional orientation of development planning. The formal, neoclassical development theory of Harrod-Domar, Fei-Ranis, and others, taught in American and European universities in the 1950s and 1960s, stressed investment-oriented planning and conservative monetary and fiscal policy. The emphasis was on growth of "capital stock" capable of generating high rates of return. In this context, social programmes were regarded as unnecessary, wasteful diversions, because, according to the planners, social gain ultimately would accrue from these physical investments.
The orientation of these neo-classical economists placed high premiums on industrial growth and gave little attention to the agricultural sector. During the 1960s, with new concern for food availability, this primary emphasis was shifted to the agricultural sector. However, the basic investment/production orientation was also transferred, nearly intact, from industry to agriculture.
Although agricultural production and rural development programmes often are justified by governments and international agencies as means of alleviating hunger and malnutrition, these programmes, once funded, usually are pursued in the traditional manner, with premiums on productivity, yield, and higher incomes for the producers. It may not be ultimately important to the planners of these programmes (a) that the producers themselves are not the hungry, (b) that the choice of production technology may not employ the hungry, or (c) that the crops produced may not be those consumed by the hungry.
During the 1970s the emphasis on basic human needs as a development orientation appeared, for a time, to be capable of shifting these premiums. In fact, the net effect of the basic-human-needs thrust appears to have been a slight increase in programmes explicitly addressing these needs: health, nutrition, potable water, sanitation. Meanwhile, the mainstream development programmes, capable of significantly addressing these needs, have continued largely unaffected-if anything, strengthenedby the recent dominance of the "Chicago School" of economic thought and the International Monetary Fund. Agricultural development planning, as taught to planners and policy-makers from low-income as well as industrialized countries, continues to place its highest premiums on rates of return, cost-benefit analysis, and foreign exchange earnings. Problems of poverty and malnutrition are recognized undoubtedly much more than before, but their solution is said to lie not in the reorientation or softening of the basic development thrust but in special programmes-costing at most a few per cent of the national budget, and emphasizing in each case technology rather than the transfer of resources.
The Project
It is against this backdrop that the design process of the Palawan Integrated Area Development (IAD) Project in the Philippines becomes significant. Everything about the project-its components, the foreign consultants involved in its design, and the funding sources -suggested a traditionally designed orientation, like that of previous IAD projects in the Philippines and elsewhere. Yet a combination of perceived national priorities, specific individuals, and timely financing permitted, perhaps for the first time in a non-socialist developing country, the large-scale influence of nutrition considerations in a major rural development programme-in this case, one with a budget of US$84 million.
The Palawan IAD Project is one of seven such multisectoral projects planned or being undertaken in the Philippines. Project planning, carried out over the course of several years, was completed in 1981. Implementation is now scheduled to begin in 1982. Palawan, physically the largest province in the country, comprises 1,768 islands and a population exceeding 300,000. Roughly 80 per cent of workers are engaged in rice, corn, coconut, or fish production. Seventy-five per cent of households have incomes below the nationally computed poverty line.
The ten-year project (in two phases of five years each) seeks to take advantage of the supposed synergistic relationships among development sectors by simultaneously addressing lowland and upland agriculture, irrigation, livestock and fisheries development, forestry, roads, cottage industry, port development, village water supply, and malaria eradication.
The Nutrition Factor
In retrospect, the inclusion of nutrition considerations in the project design and the agreement to use nutritional improvement as a primary evaluation criterion resulted from a combination of three factors: a. the considerable lip-service paid to nutrition by the Philippine Government and the perception by the Asian Development Bank that improved nutrition was a central development priority of the Government; b. the leadership role of Marito Garcia, a committed project leader, well versed both in economics and nutrition, in the National Nutrition Council (NNC), coupled with the receptivity of key individuals responsible for the Palawan IAD Project; and c. key inputs from the Food Policy and Nutrition Division of FAO. According to Palawan project staff members, the project design process was initiated using traditional production potential as the primary criterion, basing decisions purely on technical and economic considerations. The decision to introduce nutritional factors into this process was triggered by the Asian Development Bank, an institution not itself actively involved in nutrition issues in the past but anxious to reflect in its loans the development orientation of the recipient nation. The ADB, in turn, was influenced in this regard by staff members of the NNC involved in food and nutrition planning and potential participants in a six-country FAO-sponsored study on the introduction of nutrition objectives into agricultural and rural development. The NNC staff were successful in utilizing official government rhetoric to convince the ADB that incorporation of nutrition considerations in the Palawan project design was consistent with the Government's development policy.
The Palawan IAD Project staff admit that without this intervention there would have been virtually no chance for inclusion of nutrition criteria. The foreign consulting firm involved in project design refused to accept either the legitimacy of nutrition criteria or the methodology proposed by the NNC and, indeed, continued to ignore nutrition for the remainder of their consultancy. They were, however, ultimately overruled, with intense lobbying by the NNC project leadership on the assumption that the ADB and the Government wanted nutrition included.
Incorporating Nutrition Considerations
The plan pursued by the NNC consisted of the following: a. an initial assessment of the food and nutrition problems in Palawan, relying mainly on secondary data and a short field reconnaissance survey that lasted for two weeks; b. an in-depth nutrition study of 1,000 families in the project area, with data collected on nutritional status, food consumption, and socio-economic and demo graphic variables, in mid-1980; these data were analysed separately by area and occupation group, the latter broken down by categories of farmers, fishermen, and other labourers; c. incorporation of the nutrition findings into the overall project planning; and d. incorporation of nutrition criteria into overall project monitoring and evaluation; this is to include ongoing monitoring, a mid-project assessment, and a post-project evaluation. On the basis of the survey data, the NNC staff was in a position to become fully integrated into the final process of project design. Their influence on the design was considerable. Among the more important contributions were the following: 1. The targeting of areas and population groups in the upland and lowland agricultural components of the project was adjusted to address those areas and groups most vulnerable in terms of nutrition and food consumption. Particular emphasis was placed on the slash-and-burn farmers in upland areas, who were found to be nutritionally at risk.
Provision was made to give increased attention
to food crop production in upland areas where a nutritionally vulnerable population traditionally has been employed in the production of cash crops. This included provision for intercropping and for holding aside specific areas for the production of cassava and other root crops. 3. Attention was directed to the extremely low food consumption levels and nutritional status of subsistence fishing families. The project design was modified to give greater attention to this group. 4. Decisions on the placement of roads and potable water programmes were based, in part, on nutritional considerations. 5. Attention was directed to the risk of exacerbating malaria in endemic areas through increased irrigation that would provide additional habitat for mosquitoes.
A decision was made to include a nutrition programme component in the Palawan project, mainly an expansion of existing Philippine
Nutrition Programme activities {nutrition extension workers, child weighing, supplements, and nutritional rehabilitation) being implemented under the NNC. Throughout the final planning process there was a careful weighing of these nutritional criteria with other economic and technical criteria. Sometimes these appeared to be in direct conflict. It was argued that malnourished workers, suffering from anaemia, for example, and in need of project inputs to improve their overall well-being might be less productive and thus compromise project efficiency criteria. Nonetheless, discussions with the concerned individuals suggest that the nutrition advocates were equal partners in these deliberations, and roughly 50 per cent of their recommendations were ultimately accepted.
Long-Term Effectiveness
The long-term value of this planning, of course, can only be determined once actual programme operations are under way. Even when equity and welfare considerations are built into planning, there are many ways in which project inputs can be diverted to the local elite once implementation begins. The history of development bears considerable testament in this regard.
In the case of the Palawan project, the role of nutrition advocates in the planning process appears to have been highly positive. Efforts are continuing to use nutrition and food consumption levels as primary evaluation criteria. If monitoring is done on an ongoing basis, as currently planned, it will be possible to determine fairly quickly whether the desired benefits are accruing to the target groups.
The concern at present is that, if nutrition-based evaluations are carried out mechanically, they may indicate only whether or not target groups have received nutritional benefit, providing little insight into why or why not, and there would be only a tenuous connection between these data and project operations per se. This would be the case if the evaluative studies, like the earlier in-depth nutrition study, were limited to the collection of data on nutrition, food consumption, and socioeconomic status. The in-depth nutrition study, though creatively analysed and used, was in reality a fairly traditional nutrition survey-one that might have been used for any purpose-and had little specific relationship to the project at hand.
In order to avoid this problem of disconnectedness, it is necessary to think beyond the collection of nutrition/ consumption data, in both the planning and the evaluation processes. (Curiously, the FAO guidelines for these projects explicitly discouraged the collection of data on food consumption. Granted that it is difficult to collect fully reliable data, it is nevertheless strange to approach the task of improving food consumption through development projects without collecting data on it. To their credit, the NNC decided otherwise and collected and used these data, which proved to be critical for inputs into the design of the project.) Using the phasing of the Palawan nutrition integration as an example, it might have been appropriate to use the initial assessment stage as an opportunity for a series of open-ended discussions with families characterized by inadequate food intake or malnutrition. The purpose of these discussions would be to determine, from these families themselves, their own perceptions of the constraints inhibiting improved nutritional well-being, and the difficulties faced in seeking to overcome these constraints. Another (or an additional) way of conceptualizing this is to determine, through such conversations and additional data collection, the causality of malnutrition, i.e., how much of the malnutrition found is a function of inadequate local food availability, low income, high prices, systemic or enteric infection, or deleterious belief patterns, and which of these lend themselves to intervention. While project documents discussed causality, no explicit causality analysis was undertaken.
With this information it would be possible to develop specific hypotheses that could then be tested empirically in the data collection processes during project planning and evaluation. The data, in turn, together with data on nutrition and food consumption variables, would provide the basis both for focusing project inputs and for understanding better the "why" or "why not" of project results.
Examples of hypotheses that might be developed and tested in IAD-type projects are the following (selected arbitrarily and not necessarily specific to the Philippines): -Poor subsistence cultivators are unable to obtain credit for agricultural inputs because they lack formal title to the land. -Among otherwise landless families, home garden production is limited by the absence of seeds and agricultural extension, reserved, in practice, for those who produce a marketable surplus. -Cash-crop producers are periodically faced with low returns, but, even in good years, fail to benefit from the country's foreign exchange earnings. -Families are reluctant to provide solid supplementary food to young children even when it is available, for fear of diarrhoea, which they do not know how to prevent or treat effectively. While it may be argued that the collection of information on such hypotheses should be part of the overall project planning and evaluation process, the truth is that data collection on agricultural and rural development projects rarely goes beyond information on goods and services delivered, physical returns, and productivity (e.g., the number of roads built or canals dug, the number of seed multiplication nurseries established and on-farm demonstrations held, and the effect of these on water supply, soils, and yields). To understand the basis for nutritional improvement or the lack of it, these physical data are necessary but not sufficient. Between such physical data and those on nutritional status lies a considerable knowledge gap that must be closed if these nutrition components are to be successful.
The practice followed in the Palawan nutrition survey and others organized by NNC is to hire enumerators (college students or recent graduates from the area) specifically for this purpose. These enumerators are not involved in analysis or interpretation. Thus, there may be little direct contact between staff responsible for use of the data and the malnourished target families themselves.
It will be important to watch the Palawan IAD Project carefully in the coming years. The project, as now designed, offers considerable potential for nutritional benefit and will provide important data on which future efforts of this sort might be based.
IV. THE LUMBUNG DESA SYSTEM IN NUSA TENG-GARA TIMUR, INDONESIA
Background
The province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT), comprising Timor, Flores, Sumba, and some one hundred other islands in south-eastern Indonesia, has a population of 2.8 million. Much of NTT is characterized by semi-arid, hilly terrain. it is regarded by the Indonesian Government as its poorest province as well as a traditionally fooddeficient area.
The province's most important developmental advantage is that, like most of the rest of Indonesia outside of Java, there is essentially no rural landlessness. (There are, however, complex patterns of kinship ownership and land-use right and of active seasonal migration.) Landholdings average roughly two hectares, though often producing only one harvest of a given crop per year.
In this situation, concern with levels of food consumption is not a matter of access to productive resources as is the case on Java. Rather, it is a matter of food security, of protection against natural disaster (the high incidence of drought, excessive rain, or destructive winds), and the traditional musim paceklik, the famine season, which usually occurs during the last few months of the year. Farm families, particularly those with smaller holdings, are highly vulnerable in this situation. When yields are inadequate and food runs out before the January-February harvest, these families are faced with market prices for corn that have tripled or even quadrupled relative to harvest prices.
Food and Nutrition Policy
Although the NTT provincial government does not speak explicitly in terms of food and nutrition plans or strategies, it has worked out, with considerable care, a multifaceted policy designed to take advantage of provincial resources and meet food needs. The policy is based on a map of surplus and deficit areas of the province, painstakingly developed over a period of several years. (Data availability and reliability in Indonesia historically have been problematic. The data situation for the less-studied outer islands is much worse than for Java.) The map distinguishes by colour between kecamatans (districts) that have a surplus, those that are borderline, and those that have deficits.
The first prong of the policy involves purchase and movement of surplus corn from the areas with a surplus to areas with a deficit. Because of high transport costs (an estimated four to five times the average transport costs on Java), little of this surplus is moved by private traders. The provincial government has also been setting up regional storage facilities to help this process.
The second prong involves differentiated development strategies for different areas of the province. In the areas with a surplus the government is pursuing a crash programme to increase agricultural production. For the less arable borderline and deficit areas, where there may be difficulty in increasing crop production substantially, programmes have been developed to raise rural income through fodder production, fisheries, and forestry. The government stresses the importance of income generation in these areas to assure adequate effective demand to purchase the corn increasingly provided from the surplus area.
The Lumbung Desa System
The third prong of the policy involves protection against food insecurity, primarily in the deficit areas, through the system of lumbung desa, or storage at the village level. This is a recent revival of a storage system that operated in some areas under the Dutch colonial regime. The system operates in three forms in NTT: 1. Under the Dinas Pertanian (Agriculture Department), since 1979, credit packages of corn seed and fertilizer have been given to farmers located in the food-deficit kecamatans and owning less than one hectare of land. The credit package depends on the amount of land owned. Farmers pay back the loan in the form of an equivalent value of corn, which is stored in a lumbung desa and managed by the village government. Then, during the musim paceklik, this corn is available on credit to families in need, with repayment at the time of harvest. At present this system operates on a small scale in eight kabupatens (counties: Kupang, TTS, Flores Timur, Sikka, Ende, Ngada, Sumba Timur, and Sumba Barat) and is scheduled for rapid expansion.
Under the Provincial Development Programme
(PDP), and with assistance from USAID, there is provision for food credit (kredit bahan makanan) as well as monetary credit (kredit yang). This programme has been operating since 1978 in six kecamatans located in three kabupatens (Belu, TTU, and Alor). In this case, programme funds are used to purchase corn, rice, and mung beans that are available on credit to families certified as needy by the village motivator, who plays a key role in the establishment of PDP activities as a whole in the village. Borrowers have six months to repay the food, which is borrowed at an interest rate of 1.5 per cent month. The loan is guaranteed by the village group as a whole. 3. The largest number of lumbung desas, however, have been developed by gotong royong (self-help) village groups with relatively little government input beyond encouragement. Here, the capital is provided by the villagers themselves, who decide on the basis of group meetings how much food each household will contribute (the input of each family is the same regardless of household size or assets), who may borrow, and how much. In one village of 330 households in TTU kabupaten, 75 ikat of corn were collected during 1980 (one ikat = 60 ears), and were distributed to 33 households during the musim paceklik. In 1978, a particularly bad year, the village collected and distributed a much larger quantity. Occasionally, the group will decide to sell a portion of the corn it has collected for some common good (e.g., a new building). In this village, borrowers were expected to pay back double the amount of corn borrowed. In other areas the repayment rate is one and a half times. Some farmers we talked to admitted that the terms were stiff but not unfair, considering the relative prices at musim paceklik, and all agreed that vulnerable farmers are the ultimate beneficiaries.
The stock of food in the lumbung desa can be supplemented by the government in one of two ways: a. Beyond the major grain movement referred to above, the provincial government frequently purchases surplus peeled corn (which is easier to transport) and provides it to the lumbung desa for sale to members. The group then repays the government in cash, setting in motion a revolving fund. b. In 1980, because of earthquake disasters, the central Government provided to the province 50 tons of rice per kabupaten. The provincial government sold this rice on the open market, and, with the proceeds, purchased corn from surplus areas and distributed it to existing lumbung desas in deficit areas for dispersal in the traditional, group-determined manner. This is a case of triple targeting: (i) a lower status food (ii) sent to deficit areas (iii) for distribution to the most needy families. The lumbung desas are simple, thatched structures atop four wooden poles and protected against rodents by tin wrapping around the poles and/or shelves farther up the pole. The community structure is similar to those used by individual families. Occasionally fires are lit on the ground below to smoke out insects, but during the dry season this is seldom necessary. While this technique works well for traditional corn varieties, it is not effective for storage of the new high-yielding varieties, on which the husk is less protective. Separate provision and storage techniques are used for peeled corn and for rice when these need to be stored.
We were told that each of 112 villages in kabupaten TTU has a lumbung desa but that not all of these are actively functioning. In our random interviews with small farmers in the area, we learned that: -farmers are anxious to participate in such a system (all those with whom we spoke were from villages with lumbung desas); -farmers themselves are the clear beneficiaries of the system; and -where the system is functioning actively, no one goes hungry; the only exceptions identified were recently widowed women. Our questions about seasonal food consumption revealed that, where lumbung desas exist, consumption of the basic staples does not decrease at the time of paceklik. We also found that in some areas, a second type of "paceklik insurance" operates in the form of cassava kept in the earth until needed.
Complementarity with Health and Nutrition Services
There is little question that the lumbung desa system, in providing food security, has increased food intake and prevented serious deterioration of nutritional status among vulnerable groups during the annual famine season as well as during natural disasters. Thus, it clearly represents a nutrition intervention, although such language may be unlikely and unnecessary in that context.
Beyond its own capacity to improve nutritional wellbeing, however, the lumbung desa system would seem to have the potential for increasing the effectiveness of more traditional community services in health and nutrition.
It is relatively clear that, in the presence of serious food insecurity or calorie shortage, health, nutrition, and family planning services always are at a distinct disadvantage. Neither the medical black bag nor nutrition education materials can provide food per se, which, in its absence, can dwarf all other basic needs. Maternal-child health services are at a comparative advantage in dealing with children whose major problem is hunger, particularly when, as in Indonesia, the food budgets of health/nutrition programmes are small or non-existent. Also, family planning programmes never operate at their best when the survival of existing children is in question, or, more generally, when a family's outlook for the future is bleak.
Where means exist to reduce or eliminate this primary concern, complementarily with the provision of services would seem direct and substantial. If so, there would be major advantages in locating new health/nutrition services, and/or new lumbung desas, in a manner to take advantage of this complementarily.
Where such food security and health/nutrition services exist side by side, several attractive opportunities present themselves to take advantage of the complementarity: 1. A nutrition surveillance system could be established with some assurance that, once problem areas are identified, food assistance could be provided immediately. (Normally, the issue of timely response represents the major stumbling block in efforts to establish workable surveillance systems.) This would require agreement that, in such cases, food stored in lumbung desas could be used immediately for relief purposes, with subsequent reimbursement from central or provincial stocks. Such provision already exists in the PDP Programme, under which food stored in lumbung desas can also be used to meet crises in neighbouring areas, but there seems to be no such provision under the Pertanian or gotong royong systems. 2. Special arrangements could be made for the provision of food from the lumbung desas for children identified in child-weighing programmes as being seriously at risk. Similarly, where nutrition rehabilitation activities are undertaken for these children, food might be provided from the lumbung desas. In agreeing to such an arrangement, the community is essentially consenting to use its common pool of food not only to protect its families against food shortage but also to protect its young children against malnutrition. One of the problems that has plagued the community nutrition programmes in Java from the outset has been its inadequacy in dealing with children whose malnutrition is poverty determined and who, by definition, will not improve with inputs of nutrition education, oral rehydration fluid, or referral to the puskesmas (health centre) (see the following section on the UPGK Programme in Indonesia). It should be emphasized, however, that, even in the absence of these special arrangements, the location of health/nutrition services in proximity to lumbung degas should improve their effectiveness, simply because the first limiting factor-food insecurity-will have been removed.
Overall, the lumbung desa system appears to represent a sensible and rational food security component of the province's food and agricultural policies. Unquestionably, much of its value results from its response to felt needs at the local level. The system, as indicated, operates extensively in TTU kabupaten. It apparently operates less extensively in some other Parts of the province and in some other provinces, particularly on Limbok. Before any government efforts are initiated to extend this system, it would be important to understand the basis on which existing lumbung desas have been established, and whether there are culture-specific considerations that may make establishment more appropriate in some areas than others,
V THE INDONESIAN FAMILY NUTRITION IM-PROVEMENT (UPGK) PROGRAMME
Background Many governments of low-income countries, even those purporting to be committed to the alleviation of rural malnutrition, have in actuality been unwilling to develop, or incapable of developing, services at the village level. Instead, health services are developed in a hierarchical fashion with the bulk of resources used for urban hospitals and capital-intensive medical care and research and smaller amounts provided for rural health centres with a highly curative orientation. Sometimes provision is made for workers in the centre to perform outreach services in surrounding villages.
At the same time, important studies in India (Project Poshak) and elsewhere (e.g., the report of CARE's preschool child-feeding programme [11] ) indicate clearly that, unless health and nutrition services are provided at the village level and with substantial village initiative and participation, they are unlikely to be successful. In general, even integrated health and nutrition services at the primary health centre (serving perhaps 15 villages) are incapable of reaching: -the poorest families, particularly those of landless agricultural labourers; -the youngest children, those below the age of two or three years; and -those living farthest from the centre. Furthermore, even those who do come to the centre do so for curative purposes, rarely permitting continuous preventive health initiatives or the ongoing identification of children nutritionally at risk. Finally, most child-feeding efforts carried out through such health centres fail to provide the desired nutritional effects because they are inadequately integrated with nutrition education and the management of diarrhoeal infection. The CARE report found that in parts of India and Pakistan, where the norm is delayed introduction of solid food, take-home food from the centre was rarely given to young children. No effort was made in the process of food distribution to disseminate information on the importance of early solid food supplementation while continuing breast-feeding. Also, no effort was made to address the fear behind the reluctance to introduce solids, namely diarrhoeal infection, often the number-one killer of young children. Yet through the use of simple oral rehydration it is now possible to safeguard against dehydration and death from diarrhoea, and thus allay parents' natural fears about food supplementation.
The Project
The Indonesian Family Nutrition Improvement Programme, or UPGK, must be appreciated against this backdrop, for it probably represents the first large-scale effort to present nutrition services to the community in a manner that addresses each of the above concerns.
The UPGK, developed between 1974 and 1977, was a unique outgrowth of at least four sets of initiatives that proved to be highly complementary: a. nutritional concern and activity in the country (governmental and academic) going back at least 15 years, but focused on the Applied Nutrition Programme (ANP) model that was generally found to be deficient; b. a change in senior government personnel responsible for community health and nutrition activity-the new leadership was not tied to previous programmes and was willing to take a fresh look at programme needs; c. pilot-project activity emanating from efforts of medical students and faculty at Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta; d. timely inputs and support from UNICEF. The basic philosophy underlying the UPGK Programme is that the critical agent of change is neither the health centre nor the community health worker, but the mother. The ultimate task of the health centre (the puskesmas, located at the kecamatan, or county, level) and the community worker is to support the mother in this task: assisting her to see when her child is nutritionally at risk, and providing her with the means of improving her child's well-being. In doing this, the programme, in theory, can become viable and self-perpetuating without continuous external, assistance .
At the village level the community-based activities are initiated by trained village nutrition volunteers, termed cadres. The major activities undertaken are the following: 1. Ongoing identification of children nutritionally at risk through monthly community weighing of children under the age of five. This community weighing represents the focal point of all UPGK activities and also increasingly those of community health and of integrated family planning/ nutrition activities. Child-weighing, originally done with imported scales, then local market scales, and finally locally produced, inexpensive balance scales, is recorded on a carefully developed, colourful growth chart that has already been used as a model for weight surveillance programmes in several other countries. (There has also been discussion of a special weight card given to children whose weight has increased three times in succession, and the holding of village weight gain competitions.) 2. Mothers of children who fail to gain weight are, in theory, given guidance on means of improvement. Among the most important guidance is the need for solid food supplementation if it has not yet been introduced, and the use of oral rehydration fluid, either packaged or home-made, if the problem is diarrhoea. Other nutritional first aid, mainly vitamin and mineral supplements, is also dispensed at weighing sessions. There is also theoretical provision for referral to the puskesmas. 3. Children who fail to gain weight over three successive weighing periods, or whose weight falls below the red danger line, are in some areas now eligible for nutrition rehabilitation. This problem of ongoing growth failure and severe malnutrition has probably, in fact, represented the most difficult problem to address in the UPGK Programme, as is the case with many community health and nutrition initiatives. The original plan was for supplementary feeding at the village level for all young children. Some government funds and village resources were used for this purpose, but there was also heavy reliance on internationally donated food. Inevitably, this flow of food was irregular, and its interruption or cessation often had a serious negative effect on programme operations as a whole. The plan now is for supplementary food to be provided only for malnourished children at nutrition rehabilitation centres established at the kecamatan-level puskesmas. A small number were scheduled to begin operation in 1981 on a trial basis. It may therefore be several years before the effectiveness of this approach in Indonesia can be determined. 4. Once a month there are supposed to be educational demonstrations for all mothers and children on the subjects of infant feeding and weaning, sanitation, immunization, diarrhoeal control, family planning, and food preparation. A small budgetary allocation is made for the purchase of foods for these demonstration purposes 5. Home and village gardening is supported by the village cadre with technical assistance from agricultural extension workers. In low-income areas, seed for this purpose is also distributed.
At present the UPGK Programme includes (a) a basic package of services, including child-weighing, education, nutritional first aid, and health-care referral, and (b) a complete package of these plus nutrition rehabilitation and intensive home food production. The complete package is designed specifically for poorer kecamatans, At the central Government level, the UPGK is supported by several departments and agencies, most importantly the Health, Agriculture, and Religious Affairs departments and the Family Planning Agency. At the local level, efforts have been made to generate the support of village heads and community leaders. There has also been a unique effort to win the support of religious leaders through orientations and the publication of materials endorsed by the official national Islamic organization, which reproduce passages from the Koran that set forth principles of food sharing and community co-operation like those being followed in the UPGK Programme.
Rather than establish a precedent for ongoing continuous government inputs in each village, the Government has decided to limit these inputs to two years per village, a time period considered adequate for villages to organize themselves for these purposes, set up the activities, and train needed personnel. Beyond the two-year period, villages will receive only growth charts for new-born children and nutritional first-aid commodities.
On this basis, roughly half the villages in Indonesia are scheduled to be reached by the end of Repelita 3 (the third five-year plan) in 1983. Of these, 34,000 villages are to be covered by the basic package by the family-planning organization, and 10,000 are to receive the complete package under the Health and Agriculture ministries.
Assessment
There has been no formal assessment thus far on the actual benefits of the UPGK Programme in terms of deaths avoided or improved nutritional status. It is also too early to tell how many villages will continue these activities once the two-year government support ends. Some suggest that such assessment, at present, would in any case only be misleading. They argue that the role of the cadre is that of connector or catalyst, a partially social function that, by definition, can only be expected to modify behavioural patterns slowly over time, and that the expectation of quick, empirically supportable benefit is unrealistic. Nonetheless, the recently introduced data forms (requiring monthly data on the number and percentage of children gaining weight) should provide at least some indication over time of trends in programme effectiveness. Some effort is now being made to have these simple data displayed publicly in villages and used as a measure of village development.
The one existing micro-study of programme effectiveness was undertaken in East Java in a small number of villages included in a World Bank-assisted Nutrition Intervention Pilot Project. After three years of project operation, the study found a reduction in severe malnutrition (third degree, using Indonesian standards) from 14 to 3 per cent of young children, while mild and moderate malnutrition (first and second degree) dropped from 35 to 20 per cent. These results are comparable to some of the best international results taken from pilot and research projects. The study further indicated that, after three years, an average of 60 per cent of children were gaining weight each month as opposed to 50 per cent at the outset.
Of course, these study results, though impressive, need to be interpreted cautiously, not only because of the small sample and the unusual effort and attention focused on the village, but also because the prevalence of severe malnutrition found at the beginning was so unusually high (more than three times the national average) and quite possibly was a function of harvest or employment level rather than of behavioural patterns per se.
In the absence of more empirical data on programme effectiveness, reactions to the UPGK Programme are only impressions. There is general recognition that programme operations are improving with experience, better materials, and better-trained personnel. At the same time, there are important concerns about the organization of community health, nutrition, and family-planning activities in general and their rate of multiplication.
The problem is almost inherent in top-down bureaucratic systems-and virtually everything related to public policy in Indonesia is top-down. From the top (ministries or agencies in Jakarta), discrete vertical programmes in nutrition, immunization, water, etc., are developed almost always on the basis of initiative and funding from one of the many international assistance agencies working in this field. With this financial support, upper-level bureaucracy for each of these discrete programmes fills up rapidly. This bureaucracy inevitably is pressured to produce results that can be used to satisfy agency home offices in Geneva, Washington, or New York. All too often the results on which the highest premiums are placed are programme expansion and financial expenditure.
While positions fill up at the top, however, the number and quality of workers at the local level increase much more slowly. The ultimate village worker, the cadre, is not a paid government worker at all, but a volunteer. Yet most of these discrete vertical programmes rely on the same set of local staff for actual field implementation.
The results of such a pattern of vertical programmes, international pressures, and bureaucracies that are top-heavy but bottom-weary are inevitable: -Programme expansion takes place much too quickly and is based on countables-e.g., number of villages served, number of health workers, number of scales distributed, number of children weighed-with little attention paid to substance and quality control. Although originally designed as an educationsensitization programme, actual activity sometimes amounts only to mechanical weighing, with no educational element whatever. -In some areas there are as many as seven separate, vertical village-health-worker programmes operating, each relying on the health centre and many of the same village workers. -Little effort is given to follow-up and support systems once the volunteers are trained and the physical inputs delivered. One striking finding is that, of one set of health cadres originally trained, only 6 per cent are still functioning. Overall, an estimated 30 per cent of cadres drop out after the first year. At present there is no provision for retraining. The common occurrence is that activities last for three to six months and then die of inertia, in a top-down system another inevitability when "no one tells us what to do, " or when "we have already met the stipulations of the manual. " Most of the other specific difficulties identified in operational evaluations trace back, in some fashion, to the above structural problem: -Many of the cadres have been unable to explain clearly to villagers either the advantages of weighing or the appropriate follow-up. -In some areas, as a result, mothers were found to follow the programme because they had to, or obtained an input without any purpose. -Referral to the puskesmas is rare, and, when it does occur, the puskesmas often is at a loss to know what to do. More generally, the puskesmas has constituted something of a weak link in the system. There is seldom adequate understanding of, and usually little support for, these village programmes among puskesmas staff, who themselves have had no training in community nutrition. -Villagers themselves are often ignorant of programme purposes, and almost always confused by the overlap of competing activities.
-In one case, an external agency involved in nutrition education disseminated materials with messages directly in conflict with those of government materials. -There has been inadequate synchronization in the delivery of materials, equipment, and funds. In one case in Central Java: (i) training funds were delivered in August 1979; (ii) funds for village food demonstrations were delivered in June 1980; (iii) cooking utensils for these demonstrations were delivered in September 1980; (iv) the guidebook was provided in June 1980;
(v) the forms were delivered in November 1980. While these problems are in part the result of the top-down, discrete vertical-programme pattern of government services, a top-down system that works well has some capacity to deal with these problems. In Indonesia, operations of the government machinery have been improving to the point where problems such as those noted above are in time recognized at the central level and new top-down remedies are set in motion to deal with them. In the case of community services in Indonesia, the combination of central government officials and international agency collaborators represents a more effective base for such remedial action than that existing in most hierarchical government systems.
Overall, it is likely that a formal evaluation of the UPGK Programme at present would find a continuum of programme effectiveness and benefit. More than likely, benefits have been most impressive in villages where the programme has responded to felt local needs. (Some villages not included in the government's initial activities succeeded in initiating them themselves.) These villages will also be those most likely to continue UPGK activities once government support has been concluded.
VI. NUTRITION EDUCATION IN MOROCCO Background
The value of nutrition education in low-income countries has long been debated, though with little empirical basis. Opponents argue that deleterious belief patterns rarely are the primary constraint to improved nutritional status, and that where poor families have inadequate purchasing power, nutrition education is irrelevant. Advocates argue that, even in such cases, families with better knowledge of, for example, the importance of breast-feeding, timely supplementary feeding, and the management of weanling diarrhoea can compensate in part for scarce resources.
In recent years, serious discussion of nutrition education has also been introduced in the context of child-feeding programmes. A landmark study of pre-school child-feeding programmes operated by CARE in five countries found, in some areas, that only a small percentage of young preschool age children actually consumed the food intended for them in take-home feeding programmes. In these areas, where supplementary feeding traditionally is delayed because of its association with diarrhoeal infection, the delivery of such food without concurrent and effective nutrition education was found unlikely to be of any direct benefit to these children (11) .
The Project
In 1975, with financial assistance from the US Agency for International Development, the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) began a project in Morocco to introduce nutrition education into 250 social education centres that were distributing PL 480 food to pre-school children and mothers. The project involved (a) the establishment of a nutrition institute for the training of supervisors, (b) the development of curriculum, and (c) the operation of monthly classes at the centres on nutrition, health, hygiene, sanitation, and food preparation. In all, 150,000 mothers and 300,000 children were reached, the latter representing an estimated 6 per cent of malnourished children in the country. The education was provided as a complement to a large ration, almost four kilograms per person per month (526 calories per person per day) with a value of 24 per cent of the average per capita incomes in these families. The total cost of the programme was US$34.47 per person per year (comparable to the costs of other such programmes world-wide), of which roughly two-thirds is the value of the imported food. All participating families were asked to pay a small fee (US$0.54 per month).
Assessment
The programme as a whole exhibits many characteristics of a traditional top-down, externally directed nutrition intervention programme. Although Morocco's per capita GNP is roughly three times that of India (classifying Morocco as a middle-income country), its physical-quality-of-life index is lower than that of India, the result in part of an infant mortality rate as high as 170 per thousand in rural areas. In spite of this sharp disparity between resources and human well-being, the Government to date has been unwilling to assume full responsibility for child-feeding and continues to rely totally on imported food for this purpose. (The Government does pay in-country operating costs.)
The programme itself was designed entirely at the central level by CRS and its government counterparts. Not only was there no substantive local participation in programme design and development, but personnel trained for programme supervision were not selected from areas in which they would eventually work.
The above notwithstanding, the nutrition education project in Morocco must be considered a successful activity, and probably represents the first substantial evidence to support the complementarity of child-feeding and nutrition education. The supporting data, although not obtained from controlled research, are summarized below.
The first question addressed is whether or not the programme as a whole (food plus education) provided benefit. Using 1978 weight-for-age data among children 0 to 5 years of age, a comparison was made of children already in the programme (for an average of 21/2 years) and new entrants not previously in any such programme. Although one might have assumed the latter to be younger children, officials involved in the programme claim this was not the case. (But, strangely, even if new entrants were younger, there was virtually no difference in nutritional status found between the younger and older children within the new entrant group.) The other potential source of bias in such a comparison is that the 1978 new entrants might have been more malnourished than were the programme participants at time of entrance. A comparison of 1975 and 1978 new entrants indicated that these differences were not significant.
The results presented in table 4 suggest that the programme as a whole (food and education) resulted in a 69 per cent reduction in moderate and severe malnutrition. The reduction (equal to or higher than those found in comparable programmes in India, Brazil, Haiti, the Philippines, Jamaica, and Colombia-see ref. 12, table 16) might be explained, in part, by the large size of the food ration, which may have compensated for the inevitable food-sharing in such programmes.
The second, and for our purposes the more critical, question is the independent effect of education on this improvement. This was examined through analyses of two sets of data. The first set compared the weights of programme participants in 1978 with those of their brothers and sisters who had been in the programme in 1975, at which time the feeding programme had no education component. The results presented in table 5 suggest (assuming that other variables, including operation of the food programme, remained constant) that the education component reduced this moderate and severe malnutrition by half. The data also indicate a virtual elimination of severe malnutrition in the 1978 group.
As a check on the reliability of this study-and given some concern that the 1978 participants may have received food for a longer period than their 1975 siblings-further analysis was carried out by an AID evaluation team. This time the 1978 participants were compared with comparable 1975 participants who had received food for approximately the same length of time. The results were similar to those presented in table 5. In this case 33 per cent of the 1975 feeding programme participants were below 80 per cent of expected weight for age, as opposed to 11 per cent of 1978 feeding and education beneficiaries. In conclusion, the data suggest that nutrition education, creatively and effectively combined with pre-school child-feeding, has the capacity to add considerably to programme impact. This, in turn, suggests a complementarity and synergism between food provision and education that, at least under some conditions, well exceeds the potential impact of each individually. These short-run results indicate substantial benefit to programme participants even in a context of minimal local participation.
VII. SUGAR FORTIFICATION IN GUATEMALA
Background
Serious interest in the concept of food fortification since the mid-1960s emerged in part from the difficulties encountered in carrying out nutrition education programmes. The case was made that, if nutritional deficiencies are difficult to alleviate through changes in dietary patterns, why not make the existing diet nutritionally acceptable by adding to it the nutrients in short supply. The advocates of this approach recognized that food fortification could not address the major problem of inadequate calorie intake. However, problems of nutrient deficiencies, particularly vitamin A and iron, which were increasingly recognized as critical in many low-income countries, did appear addressable through this type of intervention. The fortification concept essentially enlarged that of food enrichment (practiced in some industrialized countries since the 1940s) that sought to replace nutrients originally in a food but lost through processing or because of economic factors. it was now argued that any food could be used as a carrier for any needed nutrient as long as several basic requisites were met: -the food had to be consumed by those population groups in need of the nutrient, and in relatively constant amounts; -the food had to be centrally processed to permit addition of the nutrient; -the fortification could not significantly alter the taste or appearance of the food; -the cost of the fortification could not significantly increase the consumer price of the food. The careful examination of these criteria in the mid-1960s also made it clear that the best carriers were not necessarily the food grains or dairy products that, up to that time, had been the primary foods used for enrichment. Instead, on the basis of the example of salt iodization (itself enrichment rather than fortification), attention began to shift in the direction of unconventional carriers, often consumed by most of the population, yet centrally processed. Thus, in the late 1960s and early 1970s a series of experiments were initiated: fortification of salt with iron in India and later Indonesia; and fortification of tea in India and Pakistan, fortification of MSG in the Philippines, and fortification of sugar in Central America, these latter cases primarily with vitamin A. Except for fortification of tea, progress continues to be made with each of the above, in some cases involving large-scale demonstration projects. To date, however, the fortification of sugar in Central America has been the most successful. There, as a result of tireless work over many years by the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama (INCAP)-and specifically by Dr. Guillermo Arroyave-there are now national laws in four countries requiring that all sugar for home consumption be fortified with vitamin A.
The Project
Since the 1950s, INCAP has been seeking means of addressing vitamin A deficiency, which affects almost 80 per cent of the population in Guatemala, with roughly one-third suffering from low or deficient levels of serum vitamin A (determined biochemically through blood tests on samples of the population). Most of the approaches originally considered by INCAP seemed to have some inherent drawback. Encouraging increased consumption of traditional foods rich in vitamin A-meat, eggs, and butter-would, by definition, eliminate benefit to the poor, among whom the more serious cases of vitamin A deficiency appeared to be concentrated. Low-income groups were also unlikely to purchase adequate amounts of vegetables high in carotene, given cost and taste preference problems. Massive oral doses of vitamin A represented a possibility, but this required a health system or distributional infrastructure not present in Guatemala.
The idea of fortifying unconventional foods with vitamin A had been considered as early as the 1930s by R.R. Williams and others. The limiting factor then, and for years afterwards, was the absence of a sufficiently stable form of vitamin A that could be mixed with solids. This problem was solved in 1968 when a Swiss pharmaceutical firm developed granular preparations of retinal palmitate appropriate for such purposes.
Of the carriers considered, salt was eliminated because of its extremely low consumer price relative to the cost of the nutrient. Corn was eliminated because of large on-farm consumption. White sugar was found to be particularly attractive as a carrier, given: (a) its consumption by roughly 85 per cent of the population; (b) its consumption in relatively constant quantities-36 grams per day in rural areas, 70 grams per day in urban areas-with substantial consumption by children; and (c) processing of the entire national supply in 13 large mills. Further research indicated that retinol palmitate could be added with only slight discolouring of the sugar and at a cost of US$0.001 per pound of sugar-a cost increase of one to two per cent.
As is often the case with such initiatives, the first steps in INCAP's efforts to introduce sugar fortification in Guatemala (early 1970s) were gratifying. The Health Ministry indicated active support. One of the mill owners expressed interest and agreed to initiate pilotscale fortification. The fortified product was tested in rural areas and found to be acceptable, with no settling or deterioration. Tests done on the vitamin A content of breast-milk in these areas also indicated considerable improvement.
Buoyed by these results, INCAP staff under the direction of Dr. Arroyave intensified and broadened their efforts. Alternative means of introducing the vitamin A pre-mix into the refining process were examined, with the conclusion that it is best added immediately following centrifugation and washing, with the final mixing function performed by the dryer. Further tests were carried out on taste and biological effectiveness. Feasibility and cost studies were initiated. INCAP went so far as to draw up draft fortification legislation for the Government.
It was at this point that opposition to the project began to coalesce. The most serious came from the mill owners who viewed the undertaking as a no-win proposition. They realized that neither sales nor profits would be increased, yet the forticiation would add an extra problem in their production process. The mills also feared the additional governmental monitoring of the industry that might result once fortification was under way. Even the support of the initial mill owner began to weaken, and there was strong opposition to the idea that compliance by the mills be mandatory.
Added to these issues were a series of technical ones raised by the College of Chemical Engineers about stability, separation, and decomposition. That virtually all of these issues had already been resolved by INCAP did not deter these attacks, which may not have been unrelated to the mill owners' opposition. Also not unrelated was political opposition voiced by members of the national Congress.
The opposition from industry proved too strong, and when the proposed legislation came before the Congress in September 1973 it was defeated. At this point, INCAP wisely chose not to resume their efforts immediately in Guatemala, but instead, shifted their attention to Costa Rica. There, after similar technical and political groundwork laid by INCAP, sugar fortification was introduced by presidential decree. In this case, the mills were due for a legitimate sales price increase based on rising costs. The mills agreed to accept fortification as part of the package.
INCAP then used its Costa Rica victory in returning to its task in Guatemala. Here, as has been so common with technical innovation, the demonstration effect proved far stronger than did any pioneering instinct. With the precedent established in a neighbouring country, support shifted rapidly, beginning with local newspapers and statements issued by professional groups. INCAP itself used the media judiciously to counter remaining technical criticism. In June 1974, nine months after defeat of the original bill, the fortification case was reintroduced and enacted into law.
Nutritional Assessment
Fortification on a national scale began in December 1975. In the two months prior to this, INCAP staff carried out a baseline study of the population with respect to vitamin A. Follow-up surveys were then carried out at six-month intervals (thus covering the dry and rainy seasons) for the following two years. These surveys were carried out in 12 randomly selected rural communities. Within each community, 30 families were randomly selected for study. The studies concentrated primarily on determining the extent to which the families were actually consuming the fortified sugar, and the estimated intake of retinol from this source.
In examining the delivery system, the evaluation team tested sugar samples at the retail and household levels for vitamin A content. Over the course of the surveys, they found just under 75 per cent of the sugar was actually fortified. These data were used both to reassure technical personnel of the efficiency of the fortification procedures, and to warn the factories about deviations and irregularities.
Results of the dietary surveys included in the evaluation are summarized in table 6. As indicated, the fortified sugar essentially tripled the retinol equivalents provided by the natural food sources (mainly vegetables). Whereas in the baseline survey, over 80 per cent of families had retinol intakes lower than 50 per cent of adequacy, there were now over 80 per cent of families above the 50 per cent mark. Concurrent biochemical tests on children found that the percentage with serum retinol levels considered deficient dropped from 3.3 per cent in the baseline study to 1.0 per cent in the first follow-up survey, and to 0.3 per cent in the final survey. In fact, by the time of the final survey, 10 of the 12 communities no longer had any children in the deficient category. Significant improvement was also found in the retinol content of breast-milk samples.
Finally, the evaluation included some examination of programme costs. The total annual cost in 1976 was found to be just under US$450,000, almost 90 per cent of which represented the purchase of the vitamin A. This amounted to an annual cost of US$0.07 per person in that year. The cost per child aged one to five years from low-or middle-income families and with initially low serum retinol levels was found to be US$3.66 per year, but this excludes the benefits to other population groups, including pregnant and lactating women. However calculated, the investment clearly has been successful.
CONCLUSIONS
What conclusions and generalizations can be drawn from this diverse set of studies? First and most immediately, the studies point to the conclusion that, with some threshold levels of commitment, imagination, and financial and political support, it is possible to improve the nutritional well-being of needy population groups to some extent through any of a number of different approaches. These approaches vary in terms of cost and the specific problems they address. But there is an underlying sense, looking at the set as a whole, that successful results have depended more on support and commitment than on the technical choice of intervention or on its design.
Design questions, however, are unquestionably important, and the studies, individually, point to several conclusions. The Sri Lanka and Bangladesh subsidy studies suggest that this approach, if appropriately targeted (by population group, geographic area, food commodities, and/or season) is capable of major impact without the exorbitant costs and disincentive effects often associated with them. The Indonesia UPGK Programme suggests that community health and nutrition activities with the greatest likelihood of success are those that {a) are based on community workers and community initiative, (b) include a set of complementary inputs, and (c) recognize the mother as the primary agent of change. The Morocco project suggests strongly that child-feeding programmes coupled with well-focused nutrition education are likely to produce more beneficial results than feeding alone. The Guatemala study suggests that unconventional carriers (sugar, salt, MSG, tea) probably are more appropriate than food staples for food fortification programmes.
Looking at the projects as a whole, another immediate reaction is that only the Guatemala sugar fortification project is based on what might be termed technology transfer. The one other case that might be so labelled is the oral rehydration fluid utilized in the UPGK Project. Looking at the other sets of success stories referred to at the beginning of this article, it is clear that technology transfer played an important role in none of them. This is a sobering observation in light of the enormous amount of time, energy, and resources that have gone into technological activity in the name of combating malnutrition over the past two decades.
The question of imports and dependence on external inputs is central in nutrition activities as in all development programmes. In this set of projects it appears that, on the whole, dependence on imported food has resulted in more harm than good. A substantial portion of Sri Lanka's high subsidy costs were in the form of costly food imports that probably did have a disincentive effect on local agriculture, at least in the early years of the programme.
In Bangladesh, the demise of the programme was wholly the result of its dependence on food imports. In Indonesia, irregular supplies of imported food commodities for the UPGK Programme had a highly disruptive effect. In Morocco, the complete dependence on food aid probably represents the weak link in a programme that otherwise might be taken more seriously as a domestic initiative and source of national pride. At the same time, there is no indication that the vitamin and mineral imports used in the Guatemala or UPGK programmes have had any such negative effects. Instead, they seem to be viewed as necessary ingredients that are not locally available.
This leads to the critical questions of how these activities were initiated and perpetuated. The cases of the Sri Lanka food subsidy and the NTT Lumbung Desa programmes are similar in that both were based on clearly perceived self-interest and need for protection. In Sri Lanka it was protection against food shortages and inflation during and after the Second World War. In NTT it was protection against the ravages of natural disaster and chronic food deficits. In neither case was external assistance involved.
External assistance was involved in the genesis of the Indonesia UPGK Programme, but its value came in part from its timeliness. Rather than assuming a heavyhanded, design-directive posture, UNICEF responded to felt needs within the Government-to a disenchantment with the existing services and a basic change of personnel. This sensitivity assured that the programme would be understood and appreciated from the outset as a national initiative. Such did not appear to be the case in Morocco where the project was developed in the office of an external assistance agency and then "sold" to the Government. The strong nature of the project and the lure of free food kept the project viable, but only after several years has the Government begun to view the project as its own.
Interesting parallels emerge in examining the genesis of the Philippines, Guatemala, and Bangladesh projects. All three projects were initiated by committed individuals with varying degrees of support from their institutions. All included international involvement from the outset. All three met with brief initial success and then encountered serious opposition. In the Philippines opposition came from the foreign consultants and traditional economists on the staff of the Palawan Integrated Area Development Project; in Guatemala it was sugar mill owners, engineers, and politicians; in Bangladesh it was from ration dealers and the foreign food donor.
In the first two cases, these politics changed markedly as a result of major external factors that were in part engineered, and then wisely used by project advocates. In the Philippines the external factor was support for the incorporation of nutrition by the Asian Development Bank when the bank became convinced that this was the policy of the Philippines Government. In Guatemala the external factor was approval of sugar fortification in neighbouring Costa Rica and the demonstration effect that made it compelling to follow suit. In Bangladesh there was no such external factor to counter the opposition. The Government meanwhile was content to let the project die.
Finally, there are the related issues of size, effectiveness, cost, and viability. Because most planners view nutrition expenditures as a non-investment category, akin to welfare services, and therefore to be minimized, nutrition advocates continually are pressed to come up with activities that will solve the problem without disturbing the budget. This dilemma led many in the 1960s to look for a cheap technological solution and resulted in considerable activity, for example, in the areas of unconventional protein sources and synthetic amino acids. The one successful outgrowth to date of this search for the technological fix appears to be the fortification activities discussed in the Guatemala section. The sharp reduction in vitamin A deficiency resulting from sugar fortification has been impressive indeed, and at a cost of only US$0.07 per person per year.
Unfortunately, there appears to be no comparable solution to the more serious problems of poverty-related hunger and protein-calorie malnutrition that continue to result in high rates of infant and child malnutrition and in lives often characterized by suffering and deprivation for those who survive. It is, in fact, unrealistic to expect to eliminate the hunger and malnutrition affecting, for instance, 40 per cent of a national population with 0.25 per cent of a national budget.
On a more limited scale, projects such as Palawan, UPGK, Lumbung Desa, and nutrition education in Morocco offer the possibility of some benefit to needy population groups. If implementation of the Palawan Integrated Area Development Project proceeds as planned, low-income families from disadvantaged areas may become more active participants in the development process. (Indeed, this would be an opportunity to observe a rare operational case of agricultural/rural development programmes based in part on nutritional considerations.) Indonesian families fortunate enough to benefit from UPGK Programme services will have a somewhat higher likelihood that their young children will survive and avoid the afflication of severe malnutrition. Families participating in the Lumbung Desa Programme will increase their chances of protection in times of famine. Children participating in the Moroccan feeding/ education programme will probably experience better rates of growth than those who do not.
None of these gains should, in any way, be diminished. They are important. They do save lives. On the whole, they work well. We need more successes like them. But in and of themselves, they are not likely to bring about major reductions in hunger and malnutrition in their respective countries, primarily because they are not central to the patterns of development being pursued in these countries. (In fact, in some cases these overall patterns appear to have the opposite effect on the wellbeing of the poor.) I was constantly struck by the number of senior government officials in these countries who were not even aware that such programmes existed.
Such is clearly not the case in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, where the food subsidy programmes have been highly visible and central to government concern. In Sri Lanka such concern has focused over the years on the basic needs of the poor, while in Bangladesh it has been directed to the government's urban middle-class constituency. In both countries, however, the magnitude of resources involved in this public food distribution make it the government's prime means of affecting food consumption among their population. Unlike the Morocco, Indonesia, and Philippines programmes these food subsidies have not been viewed simply as discrete projects, but rather have been key ingredients in governmental strategy and planning.
In terms of their respective purposes, there is also little question that the food subsidies in both countries were highly successful in meeting their desired objectivesthis despite the major problems and inefficiencies and the lack of targeting. In Sri Lanka the subsidy succeeded in raising food intake in the country to nearly adequate levels (only 5 per cent of the population consuming less than 1,900 calories per day). This, in the context of an overall strategy committed to basic needs, contributed importantly to beneficial effects on the distribution of income, to a reduction in death rates, and quite likely to the marked reduction in the birth rate.
In Bangladesh the public food distribution has also been successful in achieving its objective. Over the years it has been able to deliver, at subsidized prices, between 55 and 62 per cent of the food grains consumed by the urban middle-class. The comparable percentage for the 15 per cent of low-income, rural households who receive food through public food distribution was found to be 7 per cent of total cereals consumed.
The Sri Lanka programme appeared to verify the contention made by the World Bank and others that, in the short and medium term (and in the absence of major social and economic changes), such food subsidies represent the only means of significantly reducing population-wide malnutrition in low-income countries where purchasing power is severely limited. Yet the fact that substantial otherwise investable budgetary resources were necessary to maintain this programme made it, over the years, a prime target of the International Monetary Fund and other large donors, who argued that such expenditures were inconsistent with sound financial management. The focus of this international pressure was not reform of the system or better targeting-this, in fact, had been under way since the mid 1970s-but rather the elimination of subsidies altogether and return to a free market economy. Similarly, as pointed out in the Bangladesh article, there was little international support -and some powerful opposition-to the effort at better targeting there.
The Sri Lanka case is not unique. Similar international pressure was brought to bear on Egypt, Jamaica, and Pakistan in recent years to shift resources away from consumer subsidies and similar expenditures and into capital investment. The uncomfortable conclusion is that, at present, in non-communist low-income countries that are dependent on international assistance, there is a limit, or ceiling, on the extent to which resources can be directed specifically toward alleviation of hunger and malnutrition. It is clear from developmental experience in all parts of the world that neither rapid growth in national income (the goal of the IMF) nor increased food production in any way assures higher levels of food consumption by the poor, and they may even result in a deterioration of the relative wellbeing of this group.
Reorienting agricultural production along highly labour-intensive lines and toward crops disproportionately consumed by the poor would help considerably, but such efforts, to date, have also been strongly resisted by governments concerned more with aggregate production levels and by international financial institutions promoting cash crops, with the most strenuous opposition voiced by agriculturalists within these organizations. (For a thoughtful discussion of these possibilities and problems, see ref. 14.) More generally, major government action to generate employment among low-income, landless groups would, almost certainly, have high nutritional impact. Yet few governments have been willing to undertake such activity for fear of inflation, and none of the large food-aid donors has yet come forth to facilitate such employment generation by providing food aid as short-term insurance against inflation. Even where labour-intensive undertakings have been initiated, however (note, for example, the public works programmes in South Asia and Indonesia), prime benefits usually have not gone to needy, landless groups, but rather to contractors and to the large land-owners whose property has benefited from this infrastructure development. (Perhaps the best set of recent monographs on the distribution of benefits in these works programmes are those prepared by Hjalmar Brundin for the US Agency for International Development, Dacca, Bangladesh [1979] . For a larger discussion of employment generation and its relationship to food supply, see ref. 15.) It is also relatively clear that the low-cost technological means of meeting specific nutrient deficiencies do not extend to malnutrition resulting from inadequate food intake. Interventions such as those in Morocco, Indonesia, and the Philippines are usually supported from external sources but, despite their considerable success in relative terms, are limited, as discrete projects, in the impact they are likely to on nation-wide problems of hunger and malnutrition. Yet, when governments attempt to take the next step and explicitly seek to augment the real income of needy families through subsidized food prices-indeed when they pursue the only approach that the World Bank believes capable of making a substantial and timely difference-they come under such severe censure and pressure from the international financial institutions that few of them can continue such activity in meaningful fashion.
Questions of design and technique continue to be important, and the nutrition community can learn by continued surveillance of what works and why across the wide range of nutrition-related programmes However, the inescapable conclusion from examination of these studies is that, ultimately, alleviation of malnutrition will depend less on design and technique, and far more on the extent of genuine commitment on the part of governments and international financial institutions to the principle of meeting basic human needs.
